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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Marla G. Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors have endeavored to select from the many appellate
cases those that have the most significant precedential value. The
article also outlines some of the most consequential changes to
the law enacted by the Virginia General Assembly in the areas of
criminal law and procedure.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Circuit Court Jurisdiction Over Bail Hearings After a Notice of
Appeal is Filed
In Askew v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed the timing and procedure for seeking bail while an ap-
peal is being litigated.1 The defendant was convicted of possession
of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony.2 He filed his
notice of appeal and then, several days later, asked the trial court
to allow him to post bail while his appeal was pending.3 The trial
court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the bail mo-
tion because the filing of the notice of appeal divested the court of
* Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety and Enforcement Division, Office of the
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1980, Gettysburg College; J.D., 1983,
University of Richmond School of Law.
** Deputy State Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Virginia. B.A., 1994, University of Virginia, with high distinction; J.D., 1997, University of
Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
1. 49 Va. App. 127, 129, 638 S.E.2d 118, 119 (Ct. App. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 130, 638 S.E.2d at 119.
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jurisdiction.4 The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed. The court
first noted that under Virginia Code section 19.2-319, a precondi-
tion to obtain bail while an appeal is pending is that the trial
court suspend or postpone the execution of a defendant's sen-
tence.5 The court held that a defendant has thirty days to ask for
the suspension of his sentence, not twenty-one days as argued by
the Commonwealth.6 Under Virginia Code section 19.2-319, a
trial court must suspend the sentence for the length of time nec-
essary to enable the defendant to prepare his petition for appeal.7
Under a separate statute, Virginia Code section 19.2-322.1, a trial
court has discretion to suspend the defendant's sentence during
the pendency of the appeal.' The court concluded that once the
sentence has been suspended, the trial court retains ancillary ju-
risdiction to set, according to its discretion, the terms of bail at
any time during the pendency of the appeal. 9
B. Confrontation Clause
An issue that courts must address in the wake of the Supreme
Court of the United States's decision in Crawford v. Washington1".
involves the admissibility of statements made by crime victims
who are not present to testify in court. The Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed this issue in Hodges v. Commonwealth.11 In
Hodges, the prosecution's theory was that the defendant commit-
ted the murder because he feared that the victim would testify
about his involvement in drug distribution.12 In support of this
theory, the prosecution adduced a number of statements made by
the murder victim prior to her death.13
First, the prosecution adduced a written statement the victim
had provided to the police in which she claimed that she sold
marijuana on the defendant's behalf."' The court held that these
4. Id.
5. Id. at 132, 638 S.E.2d at 120.
6. Id. at 132-33, 638 S.E.2d at 120-21.
7. Id. at 134, 638 S.E.2d at 121.
8. Id. at 135, 638 S.E.2d at 122.
9. Id. at 137, 638 S.E.2d at 123.
10. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
11. 272 Va. 418, 423, 634 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2006).
12. Id. at 426, 634 S.E.2d at 683.
13. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 683-84.
14. Id. at 423-24, 634 S.E.2d at 682.
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statements implicated neither the hearsay rule nor the Confron-
tation Clause because they were admitted to show motive rather
than for the truth of the matter asserted.15 The court noted that
in Crawford, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the Confron-
tation Clause did not apply to such statements. 16
The prosecution also introduced oral statements the victim had
made to friends and family members. 17 With respect to the Con-
frontation Clause, the court observed that the parties correctly
conceded that the victim's statements, made in an informal set-
ting to family members and friends, were "nontestimonial. " The
court further held that if a statement is nontestimonial, trial
courts need not apply the framework of Ohio v. Roberts to deter-
mine whether the statements bear indicia of reliability. 19
Resolving the admissibility of the statements under the Con-
frontation Clause, however, does not end the inquiry. The state-
ments must also satisfy state law rules of evidence. The Com-
monwealth argued that these statements were admissible to
show the victim's state of mind.2" In one of these statements, the
victim's cousin was permitted to testify that two days before her
disappearance, the victim said that she planned to testify against
the defendant.21 The court held that it would be "pure specula-
tion" to conclude that the defendant was aware of this state-
ment.22 Therefore, the statement was irrelevant to show the de-
fendant's motive to murder and should have been excluded.23 The
court noted that "an individual cannot be induced to act by a fact
or circumstance that he did not know."24 The court also held that
admitting this statement was critical to the Commonwealth's
case and was not harmless error. 25
15. Id. at 432-33, 634 S.E.2d at 687-88.
16. Id. at 429, 634 S.E.2d at 685 (quoting United States v. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 59
n.9 (2004)).
17. See id. at 424-26, 634 S.E.2d at 682-84.
18. Id. at 433, 634 S.E.2d at 688.
19. See id., 634 S.E.2d at 688-89 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
20. See id. at 435-36, 634 S.E.2d at 689.
21. See id. at 424, 634 S.E.2d at 683.
22. Id. at 438, 634 S.E.2d at 691.
23. Id. at 439, 634 S.E.2d at 691.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 439-40, 634 S.E.2d at 692.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court proceeded to examine two other statements. First, a
cousin of the victim testified that the victim met with the defen-
dant on the day before the preliminary hearing and spoke with
the defendant's wife.26 The defendant did not speak with the vic-
tim but was walking around nearby.27 The court held that this
statement was admissible under the state of mind exception and
was relevant to show that the defendant was aware of the vic-
tim's accusations against him.2" The victim had also told her
babysitter that she planned to meet the defendant on the day of
her disappearance. 29 The court sustained the admissibility of this
statement under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule
and because it was relevant to show that the victim likely did
meet the defendant that day.3°
Hodges illustrates the need to address several parallel lines of
legal authority when seeking to admit a statement in a criminal
case by a declarant who is not available to testify. The prosecu-
tion must not only convince the court that the statement satisfies
the Confrontation Clause, but also that it meets an exception to
the hearsay rules, or that it is not hearsay, and finally, that it is
relevant.
C. Speedy Trial
The increased role of the United States in prosecuting crime
can occasionally create spillover effects for state criminal prosecu-
tions. In Jiron-Garcia v. Commonwealth, the general district
court certified drug charges against the defendant on July 6,
2004.31 He was held without bond in a local regional jail. 32 On Oc-
tober 19, 2004, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen-
dum, ordering the jail to surrender the defendant to the United
Statcs Marshall for a court proceeding.3 3 Jiron-Garcia was not
present for his state trial, which was scheduled for November 4,
26. See id. at 424, 634 S.E.2d at 682.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 441, 634 S.E.2d at 692.
29. Id. at 425, 634 S.E.2d at 683.
30. See id. at 441-42, 634 S.E.2d at 693.
31. 48 Va. App. 638, 643, 633 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ct. App. 2006).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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2004.14 The prosecutor informed the court that the defendant was
being housed at a different local jail because he had been "picked
up" by the federal authorities.35 After several additional continu-
ances, the defendant, relying on the speedy trial statute, moved
to dismiss the state charges.36 The critical issue on the speedy
trial motion was whether he was in state custody or in federal
custody for the period between October 20, 2004 and November 4,
2004.17 The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, finding that
he had been in federal custody during this time and, therefore,
the delay was not attributable to the state.38 Jiron-Garcia was ul-
timately convicted of possession of cocaine and forging a public
document.39
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed. First, the court
noted that the Commonwealth retains continual custody over a
defendant who is "on loan" to the federal authorities. 40 The fed-
eral authorities' failure to return the defendant did not alter the
fact that his ultimate custody remained with the state. 41 Because
the defendant was deemed to be in continuous state custody, the
speedy trial statute required that his trial occur within five
months of the finding of probable cause by the general district
court.42 Second, the court noted that "the brief period of time the
federal ad prosequendum writ was in effect, as well as any other
time directly attributable to its execution," tolled the running of
the speedy trial statute. 43 Clearly, a defendant is unavailable dur-
ing this time and this unavailability is a circumstance beyond the
control of the trial judge or the parties." In this instance, the re-
cord supported the tolling of the speedy trial period for only one
day.45 The court observed that the sparse record did not support
any additional tolling.46 There was no evidence in the record that
34. Id.
35. See id., 633 S.E.2d at 746-47.
36. See id. at 643-44, 633 S.E.2d at 747; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum.
Supp. 2007).
37. See Jiron-Garcia, 48 Va. App. at 644, 633 S.E.2d at 747.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 643-44, 633 S.E.2d at 746-47.
40. See id. at 648, 633 S.E.2d at 749.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 648-49, 633 S.E.2d at 749.
43. Id. at 649, 633 S.E.2d at 749-50.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 650, 633 S.E.2d at 750.
46. See id.
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the remaining time could be attributable to federal custody.47 The
court concluded that because the defendant was not brought to
trial within five months of the finding of probable cause by the
general district court, his motion to dismiss on speedy trial
should have been granted.4" This decision will require prosecutors
to carefully monitor inmates who testify in federal cases or who
have federal charges. The case also demonstrates the importance
of making a record on the issue.
D. "Three Strikes" Law
Under Virginia Code section 19.2-297.1, commonly known as
the "three strikes" law, a person who has previously been con-
victed of two specified violent felonies faces a mandatory sentence
of life in prison upon conviction of a third specified felony.49 In
Washington v. Commonwealth, the defendant contended that the
evidence of his prior crimes should be adduced during the sen-
tencing phase of his trial rather than during the guilt phase.5 °
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. The court held that the
plain language of the statute required the Commonwealth to pre-
sent evidence of the prior crimes during the guilt phase.51 Addi-
tionally, the court observed that, in other recidivist contexts, the
prosecution has been required to establish the prior convictions
during the guilt phase.5 2 The court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1, which establishes
bifurcated criminal trials, required that the evidence of prior
crimes be presented during the sentencing phase. 53 Finally, the
court found this procedure was not unduly prejudicial for a de-
fendant, given the limiting instruction provided to the jury. 4
E. Guilty Pleas
In Justus v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia ex-
amined the standard a trial court must apply in considering
47. See id. at 650-51, 633 S.E.2d at 750.
48. Id. at 653, 633 S.E.2d at 751.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
50. 272 Va. 449, 452, 634 S.E.2d 310, 311-12 (2006).
51. Id. at 458, 634 S.E.2d at 315.
52. See id. at 459, 634 S.E.2d at 316.
53. Id. at 458-59, 634 S.E.2d at 315-16.
54. See id. at 460, 634 S.E.2d at 317.
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whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the
motion is made before sentencing has occurred.55 Following a
typical colloquy, the defendant pled guilty to breaking and enter-
ing, malicious wounding, and destruction of property.56 The
charges stemmed from allegations that Justus had broken into a
home and assaulted her former husband and another person with
a hammer.57 Following the guilty plea colloquy and the Common-
wealth's proffer of the evidence, Justus noted that she had been
residing at the victim's home.5" The court inquired about this fact,
and counsel confirmed she had been residing there.59 Justus ob-
tained new counsel before her sentencing and moved to withdraw
her guilty plea.6" She asserted, among other things, that the at-
torney initially appointed to represent her had not properly in-
vestigated the facts of the case and that she actually had permis-
sion to enter the dwelling because she resided there. 61 Justus
further claimed that she had acted in self-defense. 62 The trial
court denied the motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. 63
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that the
defendant should have been permitted to withdraw her guilty
plea.64 At the outset, the court concluded that the defendant's
statements during her plea colloquy and the absence of evidence
regarding what she told her first lawyer about any defenses were
not relevant to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The
court next noted that trial courts are vested with discretion in de-
termining whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.6
The court held that the standard for withdrawing guilty pleas be-
fore sentencing should be more lenient than the "manifest injus-
tice" standard for withdrawing guilty pleas after sentencing has
occurred.67 Although there was no fraud or coercion in the case at
55. 274 Va. 143, 146, 634 S.E.2d 284, 284 (2007).
56. See id. at 147-48, 150, 645 S.E.2d at 285-87.
57. See id. at 147-48, 645 S.E.2d at 285.
58. Id. at 149, 645 S.E.2d at 286.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 149-50, 645 S.E.2d at 285.
62. Id. at 150, 645 S.E.2d at 286.
63. Id. at 151, 645 S.E.2d at 287.
64. Id. at 155-56, 645 S.E.2d at 290.
65. See id. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289.
66. Id. at 153, 645 S.E.2d at 288.
67. Id.
2007]
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bar, a motion to withdraw the plea "should be granted even if the
guilty plea was merely entered 'inadvisedly' when the evidence
supporting the motion shows that there is a reasonable defense to
be presented" to the fact finder.68 Along with her motion to with-
draw her guilty plea, Justus presented affidavits attesting to the
fact that she resided at the dwelling and could not, therefore, be
convicted of breaking into the dwelling.69 She had also presented
affidavits in support of a claim for self-defense.7 ° Finally, the
court observed that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was
made in good faith, based on viable defenses and not for the pur-
pose of delay.7'
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Arrest
Under settled law, an arrest occurs when a suspect is physi-
cally restrained, or the suspect submits to the officer's assertion
of authority.72 In Bristol v. Commonwealth, the defendant, who
had been drinking, drove his motorcycle into a pedestrian, injur-
ing the pedestrian and himself.73 An officer spoke with the defen-
dant at the hospital, told him he was under arrest, and informed
him of the implied consent provisions of Virginia law.74 The de-
fendant agreed to have a blood sample drawn, and the officer left
without taking any steps to restrain the defendant's freedom.75
Another officer arrived and attempted to speak with the defen-
dant. 76 The officer found that the defendant was in no condition to
talk, however, and the officer left.77 The defendant was dis-
charged from the hospital later that day.7 At trial, the defendant
sought unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence of the blood test,
68. Id. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289.
69. See id. at 150, 645 S.E.2d at 286.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 155-56, 645 S.E.2d at 290.
72. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
73. See 272 Va. 568, 571-72, 636 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2006).
74. Id. at 572, 636 S.E.2d at 462.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
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contending that the officer did not validly arrest him within three
hours of the offenses.79
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the defendant's con-
viction. The court reasoned that because the police took no steps
to physically restrain the defendant, the arrest was valid "only if
his consent to the blood test constituted a complete surrender of
his personal liberty in submission to [the officer's] assertion of au-
thority.""° In this instance, the court held that the defendant's ac-
tions did not.8 ' The defendant made no statements that would in-
dicate he was surrendering his personal liberty to the officer, nor
did any of his actions signal such a submission. 2 The court then
rejected the Commonwealth's assertion that the blood tests were
admissible under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the
search warrant requirement, 3 concluding that the mere possibil-
ity that blood alcohol may dissipate, which is present in every
DUI arrest, is insufficient to invoke the exception. The court also
rejected the court of appeals' reasoning in Tipton v. Common-
wealth, where evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol level was
admitted under the exigent circumstances exception when the de-
fendant had not been arrested within the time period specified by
the implied consent statute.8 4 The court held that applying exi-
gent circumstances to the facts at bar would undermine the struc-
tures of the implied consent laws.
8 5
B. Entry into the Curtilage
In Robinson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the police violated the defendants' Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of the de-
fendants' backyard. 6 In response to a number of telephone re-
ports of underage drinking, a police officer drove up the driveway
to the Robinsons' home and observed young persons holding beer
79. See id. at 573, 636 S.E.2d at 462-63.
80. Id. at 574, 636 S.E.2d at 463.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 575, 636 S.E.2d at 464.
84. Id. at 575-76, 636 S.E.2d at 464 (discussing Tipton v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App.
370, 444 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1994)).
85. Id. at 575, 636 S.E.2d at 464.
86. 273 Va. 26, 30-32, 639 S.E.2d 217, 219-20 (2007).
2007]
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bottles.8 7 The drinkers dropped their bottles, yelled "cops," and
ran away."8 The officer parked his car in the garage area of the
driveway and approached the back of the house, where he and
other officers observed four trash cans filled with alcoholic bever-
ages, as well as empty bottles.8 9 The trial evidence showed that
the defendants had supplied alcohol to a party attended by ap-
proximately thirty juveniles.9 ° The defendants were ultimately
convicted of multiple counts of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor. 91
The Robinsons claimed that the investigating officer violated
their Fourth Amendment rights because he had improperly in-
vaded the cartilage of their home at the time he observed illegal
activity.92 The court first held that a homeowner impliedly con-
sents to an officer's entry into the cartilage to contact the dwell-
ing's residents.93 This implied consent may "be negated by obvi-
ous indicia of restricted access, such as posted 'no trespassing'
signs, gates, or other means that deny access to uninvited per-
sons."'94 The court noted that the officer's subjective intent in en-
tering the curtilage is irrelevant.98 Turning to the facts at bar, the
court held that the officer acted with probable cause and under
exigent circumstances when he decided to continue his investiga-
tion.96 The officer had probable cause to believe a crime was oc-
curring because he observed what appeared to be juveniles hold-
ing beer bottles. 97 Exigent circumstances were also present
because the juveniles began to run when he arrived, and the evi-
dence would likely have been destroyed by the time the officer re-
turned with a warrant.98 Finally, the fact that inebriated juve-
niles might drive away further demonstrated the existence of
exigent circumstances.99 Thus, the court concluded that no war-
87. See id. at 31, 639 S.E.2d at 219-20.
88. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 220.
89. Id. at 31-32, 639 S.E.2d at 220.
90. Id. at 30, 639 S.E.2d at 219.
91. Id. at 33, 639 S.E.2d at 221.
92. See id. at 32, 639 S.E.2d at 220.
93. Id. at 34, 639 S.E.2d at 222.
94. Id. at 34-35, 639 S.E.2d at 222.
95. See id. at 35-36, 639 S.E.2d at 222.
96. Id. at 39, 639 S.E.2d at 225.
97. See id. at 40, 639 S.E.2d at 225.
98. Id. at 42, 639 S.E.2d at 226.
99. Id.
[Vol. 42:311
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
rant was required, and the Robinsons' Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated. 100
C. Good Faith Exception
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can often sal-
vage evidence for the prosecution despite problems with a search
warrant.'1 A pair of decisions from the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia provides some guidance regarding the applicability of the
good faith exception. In Cunningham v. Commonwealth, the de-
fendant was arrested following an automobile pursuit. °2 In the
search incident to arrest, police found marijuana, a razor blade, a
torn plastic bag, a lighter, $133 in cash, and several screens used
to smoke marijuana.0 3 In the affidavit in support of the search
warrant for the defendant's residence, the officer listed the items
seized during the defendant's arrest and averred, based on his
experience, that those who "use marijuana often keep marijuana
as well as devices used to ingest marijuana in their residences."1 4
The officer also noted his experience of twelve years as a police of-
ficer and his police work investigating narcotics violations. 15 Al-
though the arresting officer had learned from the defendant that
more marijuana could be found in his house, that information
was not conveyed in the application for a search warrant. 0 6 The
defendant sought to suppress the marijuana and drug parapher-
nalia seized from his home. 107 He argued that the warrant was
invalid because the affidavit in support of the warrant did not es-
tablish any connection between the drugs seized on his person
and his residence. 0 8 He further contended that the good faith ex-
ception did not apply. 109
First, the court observed that "[t]he existence of probable cause
to arrest an individual does not ipso facto give rise to probable
100. See id. at 43-44, 639 S.E.2d at 227.
101. See Anzualda v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 764, 779-80, 607 S.E.2d 749, 756-57
(Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
102. 49 Va. App. 605, 608-09, 643 S.E.2d 514, 516 (Ct. App. 2007).
103. Id. at 609, 643 S.E.2d at 516.
104. Id. at 609-10, 643 S.E.2d at 516-17.
105. Id. at 610, 643 S.E.2d at 517.
106. See id. at 609-10, 643 S.E.2d at 516-17.
107. See id. at 611, 643 S.E.2d at 517.
108. Id.
109. Id.
20071
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cause to search that individual's residence." 1 ' The affidavit in
support of a search warrant must establish a link between con-
traband sought and the residence to be searched."' In the case at
bar, the generalization that some drug users will keep drugs at
home did not obviate the need for the police to show that this par-
ticular defendant was likely to harbor drugs at his home. 112 Fur-
thermore, the affidavit in support of a search warrant did not list
any circumstances tending to show that the defendant was a drug
dealer and therefore more likely to store drugs in his home. 1 3 In
light of these circumstances, the court held that "[tihe magistrate
did not have a substantial basis to find probable cause existed to
believe that [the defendant], simply by virtue of being a drug
user, kept a supply of illegal narcotics or related paraphernalia at
home." 1 14
The court also held that the good faith exception did not save
the search. "' The affidavit in support of the warrant did not list
any factual allegations that would show the presence of drugs at
the defendant's residence.' 6 Moreover, no facts supported the
proposition that the defendant was a drug dealer." 7 For example,
the affidavit did not detail the quantity of marijuana initially
seized from the defendant."' Therefore, the "affidavit was so lack-
ing in probable cause as to render official belief in the warrant ob-
jectively unreasonable.""' 9
In Sowers v. Commonwealth, the court similarly concluded that
the warrant was not supported by probable cause, but ultimately
sustained the admission of the fruits of the search based on the
good faith exception. 120 The police stopped Sowers' vehicle on sus-
picion that he was driving on a suspended license.' 2' After a
110. Id. at 613, 643 S.E.2d at 518.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 616-17, 643 S.E.2d at 520.
113. See id. at 618, 643 S.E.2d at 520. The court noted that a drug dealer's home is
much more likely to contain contraband because ongoing activities will require records
and a renewal of supplies. Id. at 617, 643 S.E.2d at 520.
114. Id. at 615, 643 S.E.2d at 519.
115. Id. at 621-22, 643 S.E.2d at 522.
116. Id. at 620, 643 S.E.2d at 522.
117. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 521.
118. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 521-22.
119. Id. at 621, 643 S.E.2d at 522.
120. 49 Va. App. 588, 604, 643 S.E.2d 506, 514 (Ct. App. 2007).
121. Id. at 592, 643 S.E.2d at 508.
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trained dog alerted to the car, police searched it and found two
bags of cocaine, a cellular telephone, and $1263 in cash. 2 2 At the
police station, Sowers said, among other things, that he did not
use cocaine. 123 Based on these facts, the police obtained a warrant
to search the defendant's house, where they found more drugs.'24
As in Cunningham, Sowers challenged the validity of the warrant
and the applicability of the good faith exception.' 2
The court agreed with Sowers that the facts set forth in the af-
fidavit did not establish probable cause.126 The court noted that
while the affidavit did not contain specific allegations of drug
dealing, it did contain "some facts" that "support[ed] the inference
that Sowers possessed the cocaine with the intent to distrib-
ute."'27 At most, these facts showed a single drug transaction,
which
does not by itself raise the inference that the suspect has evidence of
illegal drug activity at home.... In contrast, evidence that a person
is engaged in an ongoing drug scheme or conducting multiple drug
sales can permissibly raise the inference that the person keeps evi-
dence of that illicit business in his or her residence. 128
Nevertheless, the court sustained the search based on the good
faith exception.'29 The court noted that the affidavit was not a
"bare bones" affidavit because it contained facts that supported
inferences regarding drug dealing by the defendant. 3 o The court
answered in the affirmative the "pivotal question" whether "a rea-
sonable police officer could have believed the warrant was valid
based on the facts in the affidavit."' 3 '
D. Misdemeanor Stop and Release Statute
Under Virginia Code section 19.2-74, officers must, subject to
certain exceptions, issue a summons for misdemeanor crimes
122. Id.
123. Id. at 593, 643 S.E.2d at 508.
124. See id. at 592-93, 643 S.E.2d at 508.
125. Id. at 594, 643 S.E.2d at 509.
126. Id. at 601, 643 S.E.2d at 512.
127. Id. at 599-600, 643 S.E.2d at 512.
128. Id. at 599, 643 S.E.2d at 511 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 604, 643 S.E.2d at 514.
130. Id. at 603, 643 S.E.2d at 513.
131. Id. at 604, 643 S.E.2d at 514.
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rather than effecting a full custodial arrest of the suspect. 3 2 In
Moore v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed whether a violation of this provision is a matter of state
law, for which suppression is generally not required,'33 or
whether a violation of this provision of the Virginia Code also re-
sults in a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, thus
requiring suppression. 134 Moore was arrested for driving on a
suspended license, a Class 1 misdemeanor. 135 Rather than releas-
ing him on a summons, as provided under Virginia Code section
19.2-74, the police arrested him. 136 The search incident to arrest
yielded cocaine. 137 At trial, the defendant argued unsuccessfully
that his custodial arrest on the misdemeanor offense was unlaw-
ful and violated his Fourth Amendment rights."'3 The court of ap-
peals concluded that "although the arrest violated the express
provisions of Code § 19.2-74, the arrest and resulting search did
not violate Moore's constitutional-as opposed to statutory-
rights."139 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The court re-
lied on the Supreme Court of the United States's decision in
Knowles v. Iowa, wherein the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits a search incident to citation. 140 The court also re-
lied on Lovelace v. Commonwealth."'4 In that case, the police ar-
rested the defendant for drinking in public rather than issuing a
summons.' 42 The court in Lovelace concluded that the trial court
should have suppressed the evidence seized from the defen-
dant. 4 3 The Lovelace court reasoned that under Virginia Code
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
133. See, e.g., Tronsoco v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 944, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350
(Ct. App. 1991) (noting that "[h]istorically, searches or seizures made contrary to provi-
sions contained in Virginia statutes provide no right of suppression unless the statute
supplies that right" but that, in contrast, "evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be used against an ac-
cused") (citations omitted).
134. 272 Va. 717, 636 S.E.2d 395 (2007).
135. Id. at 719, 636 S.E.2d at 396.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Moore v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 55, 61-62, 622 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Ct. App.
2005) (en banc).
140. Moore, 272 Va. at 725, 636 S.E.2d at 400 (discussing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 116, 118-19 (1998)).
141. Id., 636 S.E.2d at 399-400 (discussing Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 588,
522 S.E.2d 856 (1999)).
142. See Lovelace, 258 Va. at 596, 522 S.E.2d at 860.
143. See id. at 597, 522 S.E.2d at 860.
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section 19.2-74, the officer should have issued a summons and
lacked the authority to arrest.'" In the absence of this authority,
the arrest was invalid, and the court in Moore concluded that the
search incident to arrest violated Moore's Fourth Amendment
rights. 145 The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to
hear the Commonwealth's appeal. 141
E. Protective Sweep
The propriety of a protective sweep was at issue in Williams v.
Commonwealth. 147 When police arrived at the apartment to arrest
the defendant, they could see someone inside the apartment, but
because it was dark, they could not identify the person. 148 The de-
fendant eventually informed the police that he was heavily armed
and would shoot if they attempted to enter. 149 In response, the po-
lice called a SWAT team.' 50 After several hours of negotiation, the
defendant walked out of the apartment and surrendered.' 5 ' Im-
mediately upon the surrender, the police ran into the apartment
to conduct a protective sweep.5 2 During this sweep, they found a
loaded gun in plain view.'53 The defendant was charged with pos-
sessing a gun as a felon.15 4 At trial, he sought without success to
suppress the gun on the basis that the protective sweep was im-
proper. "'
In upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia observed that the location of the arrest, out-
side of the defendant's residence, did not necessarily render the
protective sweep improper.' 6 Based on the defendant's state-
ments, the police had reason to believe there were weapons in the
144. Id. at 596, 522 S.E.2d at 860 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (Repl. Vol. 2004 &
Cum. Supp. 2007)).
145. Moore, 272 Va. at 725, 636 S.E.2d at 400.
146. Virginia v. Moore, 272 Va. 717, 636 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W.
3410 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-1082).
147. 49 Va. App. 439, 642 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 2007).
148. See id. at 444, 642 S.E.2d at 297.
149. Id. at 445, 642 S.E.2d at 297.
150. Id.
151. See id., 642 S.E.2d at 298.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 445-46, 642 S.E.2d at 298.
154. See id. at 442, 642 S.E.2d at 296.
155. See id. at 446, 642 S.E.2d at 298.
156. Id. at 449, 642 S.E.2d at 299.
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house.'57 Moreover, the officers could have concluded based on the
facts available to them that others might still be present inside
the house. 5 ' Therefore, the sweep was justified to protect the offi-
cers or others from danger. 159 Finally, the court held that the offi-
cers properly seized the gun because they observed it in plain
view. 6 0
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Computerized Inventories
The growing use of computers inevitably requires courts to
adapt longstanding evidentiary rules to new practices. In
McDowell v. Commonwealth, the defendant and several accom-
plices were observed in a Rite-Aid store stuffing merchandise into
their clothes. 6 ' The thieves managed to escape from the store,
and police did not recover any of the missing merchandise.162 At
trial, the prosecution adduced into evidence a "Box-List Sheets
Report" prepared by a store detective, which detailed merchan-
dise missing from the store by comparing an inventory report
conducted several hours before the theft and an inventory report
conducted after the theft.163 An outside contractor conducted the
first inventory. 1" Based on these reports, the prosecution estab-
lished that the value of the missing items exceeded $1000.165 The
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the "Box-List Sheets
Report" was admissible as a business record because the report
was regularly prepared in the ordinary course of business. 16 6 The
court further held that no evidence was needed from the outside
contractor who performed the first inventory because the store
detective was fully qualified to testify about the inventory.'67
157. Id. at 451-52, 642 S.E.2d at 301.
158. See id. at 453, 642 S.E.2d at 301.
159. Id. at 454, 642 S.E.2d at 302.
160. Id. at 456, 642 S.E.2d at 303.
161. 273 Va. 431, 641 S.E.2d 507 (2007).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 433-34, 641 S.E.2d at 508.
164. Id. at 433, 641 S.E.2d at 508.
165. Id. at 433-44, 641 S.E.2d at 508.
166. See id. at 435-36, 641 S.E.2d at 509-10.
167. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 509.
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B. Expert Witnesses
In Conley v. Commonwealth, the trial court permitted testi-
mony by a licensed clinical social worker that the victim of a sex-
ual crime suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD")."'6 The defendant had objected to the diagnosis at trial
on the basis that such diagnoses could only be made by a medical
doctor.169 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
argument and concluded the evidence was properly admitted. 1
70
The court noted that PTSD is a mental disorder, and the diagno-
sis of mental disorders, unlike physical injury, is not the exclusive
province of medical doctors. 171 By statute, licensed clinical social
workers are authorized to make diagnoses of mental health. 172 Of
course, in each individual case, the trial court must still "deter-
mine whether a particular licensed clinical social worker has the
skill, knowledge, and experience regarding the pertinent subject
matter to qualify as an expert."
17 3
In a companion case, Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, the court
employed the same reasoning to hold that a licensed clinical
counselor can similarly testify as an expert concerning a mental
health diagnosis.'74 Like licensed clinical social workers, licensed
clinical counselors are statutorily permitted to make a mental
health diagnosis."'
C. Hearsay and Certificates of Analysis
The first round of appeals went to the defendant in Bell v.
Commonwealth, when the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded
that the prosecution's failure to timely file the certificate of analy-
sis of drugs in the circuit court precluded the use of the certificate
at trial.' 6 On remand, the prosecutor called the forensic analyst
168. 273 Va. 554, 556-57, 643 S.E.2d 131, 132 (2007).
169. Id. at 557, 643 S.E.2d at 132.
170. Id. at 563, 643 S.E.2d at 136.
171. See id. at 561, 643 S.E.2d at 135.
172. Id. at 562, 643 S.E.2d at 135 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3700 (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
173. Id.
174. 273 Va. 596, 602-03, 643 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2007).
175. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3500 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2007)).
176. 47 Va. App. 126, 132, 139, 622 S.E.2d 751, 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2005) (applying VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
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as a witness to testify about the analysis.177 Unsurprisingly, the
analyst could not recall the details of the specific analysis at is-
sue.178 The analyst, however, was able to testify after refreshing
his recollection with the certificate. 79 The defendant's objection
was overruled, and he appealed."'°
On appeal for a second time, the Virginia Court of Appeals de-
cided in favor of the prosecution. The court of appeals first held
that the analyst's testimony was properly admitted. 8 ' The law
does not require that the analyst be able to testify from "inde-
pendent memory" prior to refreshing his recollection."12 Next, the
court observed that its prior decision, which was based on the
statutory hearsay exception for certificates of analysis, did not
preclude live testimony by the analyst on remand. 183 Finally, the
court held that the analyst was not required to possess first-hand
knowledge about the calibration of the spectrometer that was
employed in testing the drugs.1 8 4 The analyst's extensive testi-
mony regarding the procedures employed to calibrate the ma-
chine was sufficient to establish an adequate factual foundation
regarding the reliability of the spectrometer. 185
V. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND DEFENSES
A. Abduction
After the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Virginia Code
section 18.2-47 superceded the common law requirement that the
prosecution prove asportation during an abduction,"8 6 the court
concluded in Brown v. Commonwealth that where a detention is
intrinsic to a crime-for example in cases of robbery or rape-a
177. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 570, 574, 643 S.E.2d 497, 499 (Ct. App.
2007).
178. See id. at 575, 643 S.E.2d at 500.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 575-76, 643 S.E.2d at 500.
181. Id. at 577, 643 S.E.2d at 501.
182. See id. at 576-77, 643 S.E.2d at 500-01.
183. See id. at 577-79, 643 S.E.2d at 501-02.
184. Id. at 579-80, 643 S.E.2d at 502.
185. Id. at 580, 643 S.E.2d at 502.
186. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526, 323 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1984) (discuss-
ing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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defendant cannot be convicted of both abduction and the related
crime where the detention is incidental to the other crime.1 87 Over
the years, Virginia courts have worked out the implications of
this holding, known as the "incidental detention" doctrine.
In Walker v. Commonwealth, the defendant pulled out a gun
and threatened a "repo-man" who was present to repossess an
automobile.'8  As a result, the defendant was charged with,
among other things, robbery and abduction."19 He was acquitted
of the robbery charge but convicted of abduction.'90 The defendant
relied on Brown to argue that his acquittal on the robbery pre-
cluded his conviction for abduction.'' The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia disagreed. The court reasoned that the holding in Brown
was based on the court's concern that a defendant should not be
convicted of "two or more crimes arising out of the same factual
episode," a scenario that implicates Double Jeopardy principles.'92
That concern is not present where, as here, the defendant was
acquitted of one of the offenses and, therefore, does not incur a
risk of multiple convictions based on the same acts. 93
B. Attempted Murder
In Baldwin v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged his
conviction for attempted murder, contending that the evidence
was insufficient.194 A police officer had stopped Baldwin's car for
speeding.' 95 The officer tapped on the window to get Baldwin's at-
tention.'96 Baldwin then sped off, forcing the officer to push off
from the car to avoid having his feet run over by the rear tires. 197
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the defendant that
this evidence did not suffice to establish attempted murder. 198
The court distinguished other cases in which the defendant had
187. 230 Va. 310, 313-14, 337 S.E.2d 711, 713-14 (1985).
188. 272 Va. 511, 513-15, 636 S.E.2d 476, 477-78 (2006).
189. Id. at 512, 636 S.E.2d at 477.
190. Id. at 512-13, 636 S.E.2d at 477.
191. Id. at 515, 636 S.E.2d at 478.
192. Id. at 516, 636 S.E.2d at 479.
193. Id.
194. 274 Va. 276, 278, 645 S.E.2d 433, 433 (2007).
195. See id.
196. Id., 645 S.E.2d at 434.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 282, 645 S.E.2d at 435-36.
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tried to run over an officer with his vehicle.199 The court con-
cluded that, given the clear evidence of the officer's position-that
he was standing next to the car rather than in its path-the evi-
dence failed to show any attempt to murder. 200
C. Burglary
Virginia's confusing scheme for burglary lists several offenses,
including "statutory" burglary and "common law" burglary." 1 In
Wright v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with com-
mon law burglary, that is, breaking and entering a dwelling in
the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony or larceny in the
dwelling.0 2 At trial, the evidence showed that the burglary oc-
curred in the daytime, a fact conceded by the Commonwealth on
appeal.20 3 The Court of Appeals of Virginia noted that this evi-
dence was fatal to the conviction for common law burglary be-
cause the word "night" is defined as "the time from sunset to sun-
rise."20 4 In response, the Commonwealth contended that statutory
burglary was a lesser-included offense of common law burglary. 205
The court agreed. After analyzing the elements of the two of-
fenses, the court held that the only difference between common
law burglary and statutory burglary was the requirement that
the prosecution prove that the burglary occurred at night. 206 Since
the prosecution had proven all the elements of the statutory bur-
glary offense, the court remanded the case for resentencing on
that charge.20 7
199. Id. at 281-82, 281 n.3, 645 S.E.2d at 435 & n.3 (distinguishing Coles v. Common-
wealth, 270 Va. 585, 621 S.E.2d 109 (2005); Holley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 228,
604 S.E.2d 127 (Ct. App. 2004); Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 567 S.E.2d
537 (Ct. App. 2002); Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 508 S.E.2d 354 (Ct. App.
1998)).
200. Id. at 281-82, 645 S.E.2d at 435-36.
201. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-89 to -91 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
202. 49 Va. App. 312, 314, 641 S.E.2d 119, 120 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-89 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007)).
203. Id. at 319, 641 S.E.2d at 122.
204. Id. at 318-19, 641 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (8th ed.
2004)).
205. Id. at 319, 641 S.E.2d at 122.
206. Id. at 320, 641 S.E.2d at 123.
207. Id. at 321, 641 S.E.2d at 123.
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D. Capital Murder
In Gray v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of
capital murder based on, among other things, "[t]he willful, delib-
erate and premeditated killing of a person under the age of four-
teen by a person age twenty-one or older.""' Gray argued that
this statute violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.2"9 He noted that Virginia's capital murder predicate exposes
certain defendants to the death penalty, while allowing others
who are similarly situated to avoid this punishment.210 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia rejected the argument. The court first
noted that classifications based on age do not trigger a strict scru-
tiny analysis.211 Furthermore, the classification at issue did not
implicate a fundamental right.212 Therefore, the statute would be
reviewed under the deferential "rational basis" standard.213 The
court sustained the classification, holding that the General As-
sembly could rationally "distinguish[ I between criminal defen-
dants based on both the age of the defendant and the span in age
between a victim and the defendant."
214
E. Concealed Weapons
Virginia Code section 18.2-308(A) prohibits the carrying of
guns and certain knives, including "any dirk, bowie knife,
switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, slingshot,
spring stick, metal knucks, or blackjack" or a "weapon of like
kind."215 The Supreme Court of Virginia clarified the scope of the
"weapon of like kind" provision in Farrakhan v. Common-
wealth.216 The defendant had brandished a kitchen knife from his
jacket when he was confronted by a store manager about stealing
208. 274 Va. 290, 294, 305, 645 S.E.2d 448, 451, 457 (2007).
'209. Id. at 305, 645 S.E.2d at 457.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 306, 645 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Kimel v. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-84
(2000)).
212. Id. at 307, 645 S.E.2d at 459.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 312, 645 S.E.2d at 462.
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
216. 273 Va. 177, 639 S.E.2d 227 (2007).
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a pair of boots.217 Police apprehended the defendant soon after he
ran out of the store.218 Farrakhan was convicted of robbery and of
carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of section 18.2-308(A),
after having been previously convicted of a felony offense.219 In af-
firming the conviction, the court of appeals had examined the
characteristics of the weapon and the "circumstances surrounding
its use., 220 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The court ob-
served that all of the items listed in the statute are "weapons."221
The court reasoned that for an item to qualify as a "weapon of
like kind," a court must first satisfy itself that the item is, in fact,
22a weapon. 22 If it is a weapon, a court can then examine the physi-
cal characteristics of the weapon and compare those to the weap-
ons listed in the statute.223 Otherwise, the court noted, a chef who
carries his knives on the way to work, or a person who purchases
a letter opener and "conceals" it in the store bag would violate the
statute.224 The court concluded that the General Assembly could
not have intended this outcome.225 In light of this analysis, the
court held that the defendant's kitchen knife was "not designed
for fighting purposes nor is it commonly understood to be a
...226
weapon.
F. Destruction of Property
In McDuffie v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed whether a husband who destroys his wife's car in a fit
of anger can be charged with unauthorized use and destruction of
property "not his own." 227 After a violent argument, the defendant
seized the keys to an automobile that was titled exclusively in his
217. See id. at 179, 639 S.E.2d at 228-29.
218. See id. at 180, 639 S.E.2d at 229.
219. Id.
220. Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1804-04-4, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 477, at
*8-9 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005).
221. See Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 182, 639 S.E.2d at 230.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 183, 639 S.E.2d at 230.
227. 49 Va. App. 170, 173, 638 S.E.2d 139, 140 (Ct. App. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
102 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007) (prohibiting the unauthorized use of a motor ve-
hicle "not his own" without the owner's consent); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137 (Repl. Vol.
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2007) (prohibiting, inter alia, the destruction of property "not his
own").
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wife's name and drove away. 2 He soon jumped a curb, went air-
borne, and destroyed the car by colliding with another vehicle.229
The defendant contended that, as the husband of the vehicle
owner, he had a vested property right in the automobile and,
therefore, could not be convicted of destroying, or of using without
authorization, a vehicle "not his own. "230 The court disagreed, not-
ing that the simple fact of marriage does not give a husband any
legal interest in his wife's tangible personal property. 231 For ex-
ample, the court observed, a husband can be convicted of larceny
of his wife's property. 232 The court further reasoned that the equi-
table distribution statutes do not affect the result in this case.
2 33
In the case at bar, the parties were not divorcing, and no equita-
ble distribution order had been entered. 2' 4 Therefore, the defen-
dant "had only an inchoate and unvested interest, if any, in [his]
wife's automobile. ''235
G. Driving Under the Influence
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals addressed the
complex interplay of general district court and circuit court juris-
diction.236 The defendant was arrested for DUI. 237 Before trial on
this charge, he was charged with another DUI. 23" The defendant
was convicted on the first charge, and he appealed that case to
the circuit court.239 While the de novo retrial in circuit court was
pending, he proceeded to trial in general district court on the sec-
ond DUI arrest, which was charged as a DUI, second offense.24 °
In his second general district court trial, he was convicted of "sim-
ple" DUI, rather than DUI, second offense. 241 He also appealed
228. McDuffie, 49 Va. App. at 174-75, 638 S.E.2d at 141.
229. 49 Va. App. at 174, 638 S.E.2d at 141.
230. Id. at 175, 638 S.E.2d at 141.
231. Id. at 176, 638 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting Stewart v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 887,
889, 252 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1997)).
232. Id. (quoting Stewart, 219 Va. at 891, 252 S.E.2d at 332).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 176-77, 638 S.E.2d at 142.
235. Id. at 177, 638 S.E.2d at 142.
236. 49 Va. App. 381, 385-87, 641 S.E.2d 771, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007).
237. Id. at 384, 641 S.E.2d at 772.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See id.
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that conviction, and then withdrew his appeal of the first DUI
conviction, thus affirming his conviction from the general district
court. 242 He proceeded to trial on the appeal from his other DUI
conviction, where the prosecution moved to amend the charge to
DUI, second offense.243 The defendant objected on double jeopardy
grounds, arguing that his acquittal below precluded the amend-
ment.2" The trial court overruled the objection, and he was ulti-
mately convicted of DUI, second offense.245
The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that the trial court
should not have permitted the prosecution to amend the charge in
circuit court from DUI to DUI, second offense.2 46 The court rea-
soned that the defendant's conviction in the general district court
of a DUI rather than DUI, second offense, was necessarily an ac-
quittal of the charge of DUI, second offense.2 47 In light of this ac-
quittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause mandated that the defendant
could be convicted of no higher offense than simple DUI.24 The
court remanded the case for resentencing on a conviction for sim-
ple DUI.249
The DUI statutes contain several rebuttable presumptions
based on the blood alcohol level of a driver. 250 The defendant in
Yap v. Commonwealth argued that these rebuttable presump-
tions are unconstitutional because they shift the burden of prov-
ing an element of the offense away from the prosecution and on to
the defendant.251 The court of appeals held that the presumptions
in the DUI statutes, consistent with other statutory presump-
tions, should be construed as permissive inferences.2 2 The court
observed that permissible inferences, unlike mandatory presump-
tions, do not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proving one of
the elements of the offense to the defendant because the jury can,
but is not required to, draw a particular inference.2 3 The record
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 384-85, 641 S.E.2d at 772.
246. Id. at 389, 641 S.E.2d at 775.
247. Id. at 386, 641 S.E.2d at 773.
248. See id. at 388-89, 641 S.E.2d at 774-75.
249. Id. at 389, 641 S.E.2d at 775.
250. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-266 to -269 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
251. 49 Va. App. 622, 629, 643 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ct. App. 2007).
252. See id. at 633, 636, 643 S.E.2d at 528, 530.
253. Id. at 632-34, 643 S.E.2d at 527 (citing Francis v. Commonwealth, 471 U.S. 307,
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demonstrated that the trial court properly construed the pre-
sumptions as permissive inferences, and therefore the defendant
suffered no violation of his constitutional rights.2 4 Finally, con-
cluding that the defendant had not properly raised the issue, the
court declined to address the defendant's arguments that the pre-
sumptions at issue are irrational, because there is no relation be-
tween the blood alcohol at the time of testing and the blood alco-
hol level at the time of driving.2 5
H. Felony Child Neglect
The quantum of evidence that suffices for a conviction of felony
child neglect has attracted the attention of Virginia's appellate
courts in recent years. Two cases from the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia illustrate the court's attempts to draw the line between bad
parenting or errors in judgment and outright criminal behavior.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, police, wearing body armor and with
weapons drawn, executed an "immediate-entry" search war-
rant.256 Police had obtained the warrant after learning about ex-
tensive drug trafficking at a residence; they also expected to find
weapons. 257 During the search, the police found an eight-year-old
child on a bed, working on his homework.25 Near this bed, police
found a bottle containing fourteen capsules of heroin in a "child-
proof' container.259 Police also found, under the bed, a plate with
a dusting of cocaine and drug packaging materials.26 ° Seven other
children, ranging in age from infancy to seven or eight-years-old,
were present in the next bedroom.261 The evidence at trial showed
that the defendant was dealing drugs out of the apartment.262 At
trial and on appeal, the defendant contended that her drug deal-
ing activities in the apartment and the close proximity of her
child to the drugs were insufficient to show a "gross, wanton, and
314 (1984)).
254. Id. at 633-34, 643 S.E.2d at 528.
255. See id. at 634, 643 S.E.2d at 528-29.
256. 272 Va. 692, 695, 636 S.E.2d 403, 404 (2006).
257. See id. at 695, 636 S.E.2d at 404.
258. See id. at 696, 636 S.E.2d at 404-05.
259. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 405.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 695, 636 S.E.2d at 404.
262. Id. at 696, 636 S.E.2d at 405.
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willful disregard for human life," as required by Virginia Code
section 18.2-371.1(B)(1). 263
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld her conviction. The
court examined persuasive authority from other states;2 and
concluded that "the dangers inherent in such a situation could be
inferred by the fact finder as a matter of common knowledge. 265
The court found it significant that the drugs were "within arm's
reach of an unattended young child."266 The fact that the drugs
were in a childproof container did not compel a different result
since the child could easily follow the directions on the bottle to
open it. 267 Finally, the court agreed with the defendant's argu-
ment that the prosecution must establish "more than a mere pos-
sibility of harm." 268 In this instance, however, under an objective
standard, the defendant "knew or should have known that her
continuous and illegal drug activity at the apartment when her
young child was present also created a substantial risk of serious
injury from the dangers inherent in the illicit drug trade."269
Conversely, in Morris v. Commonwealth, the court found the
evidence insufficient for a conviction of felony child neglect.2 70 Af-
ter receiving a report that a child was not in school, a family sup-
port worker found two children, one five-and-a-half years old and
the other two-and-a-half years old, playing in a wooded area near
a road.271 The younger child was naked and dirty, and he had
dried fecal matter on his leg.272 Two police officers arrived and
questioned the mother,2 73 who initially stated that she was the
263. Id. at 697, 636 S.E.2d at 405. Under Virginia Code section 18.2-371.1(B)(1), any
parent or guardian who, in their care for a child, is "so gross, wanton and culpable as to
show a reckless disregard for human life" is guilty of a Class 6 misdemeanor. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
264. Jones, 272 Va. at 699-700, 636 S.E.2d at 406-07 (citing State v. -Padva, 869 A.2d
192 (Conn. 2005) (affirming conviction of defendants who kept marijuana in close prox-
imity to two young children); State v. Graham, 109 P.3d 285 (N.M. 2005) (upholding child
abuse conviction against parents who left drugs and drug paraphernalia in the immediate
vicinity of small children)).
265. Id. at 700, 636 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 Va. 377,
386, 593 S.E.2d 210, 215 (2004)).
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 701, 636 S.E.2d at 408.
269. Id. at 701-02, 636 S.E.2d at 408.
270. 272 Va. 732, 740, 636 S.E.2d 436, 440 (2006).
271. See id. at 734-35, 636 S.E.2d at 437.
272. Id. at 735, 636 S.E.2d at 437.
273. See id. at 735-36, 636 S.E.2d at 438.
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children's aunt. Eventually she admitted to being the children's
mother and said that she had locked both locks on the door before
falling asleep.274 The mother acknowledged that she had a sub-
stance abuse problem, but said she had not abused drugs during
the previous three days.
2 71
In reversing, the court noted that she had double locked her
door before going to sleep and, moreover, there was no evidence
she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time.27 6 In
sum, the evidence did not show that the defendant committed any
"willful act or omission in the care of her children that was so
gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for
their lives. 277 However, illustrating the difficulty in this area,
three of the justices dissented.278
I. Felony Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Accident
The defendant in Robinson v. Commonwealth contended that
he could not be convicted of leaving the scene of an accident be-
cause he was not "involved" in the accident. 279 The evidence at
trial showed that Robinson, who had the right-of-way, noticed
that another car was about to cut him off where two lanes merged
into one. 2 0 He accelerated "briskly" to prevent the other vehicle
from surging ahead. 21 The driver of the other car, a mother with
her young child in the car, accelerated to over seventy-five miles
per hour.28 2 The posted speed limit was forty miles per hour.28 3
Shortly afterwards, Robinson reduced his speed to allow the other
driver to enter his lane of travel. 2 4 The other vehicle spun out of
274. Id. at 736, 636 S.E.2d at 438.
275. Id. at 737, 636 S.E.2d at 438.
276. Id. at 740, 636 S.E.2d at 440.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 740-43, 636 S.E.2d at 441-42.
279. 274 Va. 45, 51, 645 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2007); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-894
(Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2007) (requiring a driver involved in an accident resulting
in injury, death, or property damage to stop as near the accident scene as possible and re-
port it to the police).
280. See Robinson, 274 Va. at 49, 645 S.E.2d at 471-72.
281. Id. at 50, 645 S.E.2d at 472.
282. Id. at 48, 50, 645 S.E.2d at 471, 472.
283. Id. at 48-49, 645 S.E.2d at 471.
284. See id. at 50, 645 S.E.2d at 472.
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control and struck a tree, killing the mother and her child.2 5 Rob-
inson's vehicle never made contact with the other car.28 6
In construing the statute, the court noted that the dictionary
contained many different definitions of the word "involved. 28 7
Such a wide range of definitions, the court reasoned, would be in-
consistent with the strict construction of penal statutes.2 8 The
court held that
in order for a driver of a vehicle to be involved in an accident within
the intendment of the statute, there must be physical contact be-
tween the driver's vehicle and another vehicle, person, or object, or
the driver of a motor vehicle must have been a proximate cause of an
accident. 289
The court found that neither of these two circumstances was pre-
sent and reversed the defendant's conviction. 290
J. Involuntary Manslaughter
In O'Connell v. Commonwealth, a drag race between two Cor-
vette enthusiasts ended in tragedy when one of the cars spun out
of control, killing both occupants. 291 The defendant, who had par-
ticipated in the drag race, was charged and convicted of a number
of offenses, including involuntary manslaughter.292 He challenged
this conviction on the ground that it was the victim's negligence,
rather than his own, that was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. 29' He noted that the two racing vehicles never came into
contact.2 94 The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this conten-
tion. First, the court noted that "[tihere can be more than one
proximate cause [of an incident] and liability attaches to each
person whose negligent act results in the victim's injury or
285. Id. at 50-51, 645 S.E.2d at 472-73.
286. Id. at 50, 645 S.E.2d at 472.
287. Id. at 52, 645 S.E.2d at 473 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1191 (1993)).
288. Id., 645 S.E.2d at 473-74 (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459,
309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)).
289. Id. at 53, 645 S.E.2d at 474.
290. Id. at 53-54, 645 S.E.2d at 474.
291. 48 Va. App. 719, 724, 634 S.E.2d 379, 381-82 (Ct. App. 2006).
292. Id. at 722-23, 634 S.E.2d at 381.
293. Id. at 728, 634 S.E.2d at 383.
294. Id.
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death." '295 The court also noted that the defense of contributory
negligence did not apply in a criminal prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter. 296 The court held that the defendant would be ab-
solved only where the actions of the deceased constituted "an in-
dependent and intervening act that alone caused the fatal acci-
dent."297 Intervening acts that are reasonably foreseeable "cannot
be relied upon as breaking the chain of causal connection between
an original act of negligence and subsequent injury."29 The fact
that a driver might lose control and crash is a "reasonably fore-
seeable" result of a drag race. 299 Therefore, the defendant was
properly convicted of involuntary manslaughter, regardless of the
concurring negligence of the deceased.3"'
K. Obstruction of Justice
The obstruction of justice statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-
460, contains two very similar provisions, one a misdemeanor and
the other a felony. The additional language found in the felony
version is highlighted in italics:
If any person by threats of bodily harm or force knowingly attempts
to intimidate or impede a judge, magistrate, justice, juror, attorney
for the Commonwealth, witness, or any law-enforcement officer, law-
fully engaged in the discharge of his duty, or to obstruct or impede
the administration of justice in any court relating to a violation of or
conspiracy to violate § 18.2-248 or subdivision (a)(3), (b) or (c) of §
18.2-248.1, or § 18.2-46.2 or § 18.2-46.3, or relating to the violation of
or conspiracy to violate any violent felony offense listed in subsection
C of § 17.1-805, he shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. 301
In Washington v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia addressed what the prosecution must prove to secure a fel-
ony conviction under the statute. °2  Washington's charges
stemmed from his threat to kill two sheriff deputies who were es-
295. Id. (quoting Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 447, 436 S.E.2d 421, 425
(1993)).
296. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 383-84 (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 549,
586 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2003)).
297. Id. at 729, 634 S.E.2d at 384.
298. Id. (quoting Delawder v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 55, 58, 196 S.E.2d 913, 915
(1973)).
299. Id.
300. See id. at 732, 634 S.E.2d at 385.
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
302. 273 Va. 619, 622, 643 S.E.2d 485, 486 (2007).
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corting him back to the jail from the courthouse. °3 He contended
that he could not be convicted of felony obstruction of justice be-
cause the Commonwealth had failed to prove an element of the
offense: that the duties the deputies were discharging .'relat[ed]
to a violation of or conspiracy to violate' one of the felony offenses
specified" in the statute.0 4 The court noted that the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia had reached inconsistent results in construing
the statute.0 5
The court observed that from a strict grammatical standpoint,
the statute created two offenses: (1) intimidating or impeding a
law-enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the discharge of his
duty and (2) obstructing or impeding the administration of justice
in any court relating to a violation of or conspiracy to violate one
of the specified statutes. 3 6 However, the court proceeded to note
that the "true meaning" of the statute should prevail, "though
contrary to the apparent grammatical construction." 30 7 The court
reasoned that one problem with a strict grammatical construction
is that it eliminates the distinction between the misdemeanor
version and the felony version 30 ' because subsection (C) contains
a harsher punishment. "[T]here must be a difference in the ele-
ments of the two offenses ...., The court held that the differ-
ence is the phrase "relating to a violation of or conspiracy to vio-
late" one of the listed felony offenses. 310 Thus, to prove felony
obstruction of justice, the Commonwealth was required to prove
that when the defendant made threats of bodily harm to the offi-
cers, the officers were engaged in the performance of duties that
"relat[ed] to a violation of or conspiracy to violate" one of the
listed felony offenses. 311 Because the prosecution adduced no such
proof, it failed to prove an element of the offense.312
303. See id., 643 S.E.2d at 486-87.
304. Id. at 622-23, 643 S.E.2d at 487.
305. Id. at 625-26, 643 S.E.2d at 488 (comparing Garcia v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.
App. 184, 578 S.E.2d 97 (Ct. App. 2003), with Turner v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 713,
460 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1995)).
306. Id. at 627, 643 S.E.2d at 489.
307. Id. (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 620, 624, 128 S.E. 578, 579 (1925)).
308. See id.
309. Id. at 628, 643 S.E.2d at 490.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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In Jordan v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with
felony obstruction of justice.313 The charge stemmed from two
separate circumstances. First, police discovered that, while hand-
cuffed in the police cruiser, Jordan had taken a roll of cash the of-
ficer had seized and placed it in his pants. 314 The court held that
this conduct did not involve the use of force and, therefore, did
not satisfy the plain language of the obstruction of justice stat-
ute.315
Second, while in the magistrate's office, the defendant continu-
ally tried to pull away from the officer, forcing the officer to pin
the defendant against a wall or a door on several occasions.316 He
also stopped repeatedly while walking, making the officer bump
into him.31 7 Instead of cooperating with the police during the in-
take process, the defendant "put his hands 'down the front of his
pants and began playing with his genitalia.' 31  The defendant
"refused to answer questions in a timely fashion" during the in-
take process. 319 The court noted that merely rendering an officer's
task more difficult does not suffice for conviction if the actions do
not "impede or prevent" the officer from performing the task.32 °
The court reasoned that while the defendant was "less than coop-
erative" and his conduct made it "more difficult" for the officer to
discharge his duties, nevertheless, the defendant's conduct did
not involve the use of force and did not "impede or prevent" the
officer from performing his duties.32' Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the evidence was insufficient and reversed his convic-
tion.322
L. Sex Crimes
In Molina v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged the suf-
ficiency of the evidence for his rape and forcible sodomy convic-
313. 273 Va. 639, 642, 643 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2007).
314. See id. at 643, 643 S.E.2d at 168.
315. See id. at 648, 643 S.E.2d at 171-72.
316. See id. at 643-44, 643 S.E.2d at 169.
317. Id. at 644, 643 S.E.2d at 169.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 648, 643 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Ct. App. 1998)).
321. Id. at 649, 643 S.E.2d at 172.
322. Id.
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tions. 23 The victim, who had a history of seizures accompanied by
blackouts, met the defendant near a convenience store.324 She was
standing near a wall, drinking wine. 325 The two began to talk and
soon afterwards were kissing. 326 It is unclear whether the victim
fell and struck her head or was struck and then fell; police found
her partially unclothed behind a dumpster.327 The defendant ac-
knowledged having intercourse with the victim, but contended
that the intercourse was consensual. 3" The victim, who had a
substantial amount of alcohol in her bloodstream as well as co-
caine and benzodiazepines, denied that she ever consented to
having sexual intercourse with the defendant.329 The defendant
was convicted of rape based on the victim's "mental incapacity or
physical helplessness."330 He argued that the term "mental inca-
pacity" should be limited "to a permanent mental condition such
as retardation rather than a transitory condition such as volun-
tary intoxication."33' The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
narrow construction of the statute and held that the definition of
the term provided in the statute does not so limit mental incapac-
ity.33 2 Indeed, the mental incapacity need only exist "at the time
of an offense."3 3 The court concluded that "the term 'mental inca-
pacity' may extend to a transitory circumstance such as intoxica-
tion if the nature and degree of the intoxication has gone beyond
the stage of merely reduced inhibition and has reached a point
where the victim does not understand 'the nature or conse-
quences of the sexual act.' 334
In Davis v. Commonwealth, the defendant was arrested for be-
ing drunk in public.335 He struggled during the arrest and contin-
ued his obstreperous behavior in the lockup, as well as when po-
323. 272 Va. 666, 669, 636 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2006).
324. See id. at 669-70, 636 S.E.2d at 472-73.
325. Id. at 669, 636 S.E.2d at 472.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 669-70, 636 S.E.2d at 472.
328. See id. at 670, 636 S.E.2d at 472.
329. See id. at 671, 636 S.E.2d at 473.
330. See id. at 671-72, 636 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2004)).
331. Id. at 673, 636 S.E.2d at 474.
332. Id.
333. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
334. Id. (quoting § 18.2-67.10(3)).
335. 272 Va. 476, 477, 634 S.E.2d 322, 322 (2006).
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lice attempted to move him to a single cell.336 During this strug-
gle, the defendant reached between the legs of a female officer
and pushed his finger inside the front lips of her vagina.337 At the
time, the officer was wearing her standard uniform and under-
garments.338 The defendant contended that these facts did not
suffice to convict him of object sexual penetration.339 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed. First, the court observed that
Virginia Code section 18.2-67.2(A) "only requires slight penetra-
tion."34 ° Second, nothing in the statute requires "skin-to-skin"
contact.341 The court reasoned that whether the penetration oc-
curs directly or through clothing, the acts are "comparably inva-
sive."342 The court observed that the presence and amount of the
clothing may lead the factfinder to conclude that no penetration
occurred.343 In the final analysis, however, the "[e]xistence of such
material does not.., protect defendants from prosecution under
the statute."344
The Supreme Court of Virginia sustained Virginia's "crimes
against nature" statute, also known as the sodomy statute,345
against an "as-applied" constitutional challenge in McDonald v.
Commonwealth.346 The defendant, who was in his mid-forties, en-
gaged in consensual "oral sodomy" with two girls, one aged six-
teen and one who was seventeen years old.347 McDonald's primary
argument was that his conviction ran afoul of the court's holding
in Martin v. Ziherl.3 41 In rejecting this argument, the court also
considered the Supreme Court of the United States's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.349 The court distinguished those decisions,
which involved consenting adults, with the case at bar, which in-
336. See id. at 477-78, 634 S.E.2d at 322-23.
337. Id. at 478, 634 S.E.2d at 323.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 477, 634 S.E.2d at 322.
340. Id. at 479, 634 S.E.2d at 323.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 479-80, 634 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting United States v. Norman T., 129 F.3d
1099, 1103 (10th Cir. 1997)).
343. Id. (quoting Norman T., 129 F.3d at 1103).
344. Id. at 480, 634 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Norman T., 129 F.3d at 1103).
345. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
346. 274 Va. 249, 260, 645 S.E.2d 918, 924 (2007).
347. Id. at 251, 645 S.E.2d at 919.
348. See id. at 256, 645 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 607 S.E.2d
367 (2005)).
349. See id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
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volved minors. 3" The court declined to import into the sodomy
statute the age restrictions found in other statutes criminalizing
sexual conduct.351 Finally, the court refused to address McDon-
ald's facial challenge to the validity of the statute because he had
not raised the issue in the trial court. 52
M. Settled Insanity
Like the cicadas who periodically emerge from obscurity, Vir-
ginia appellate courts address the defense of "settled insanity"
approximately once every decade. This defense is an exception to
the general rule that voluntary intoxication is no defense to a
crime.35 3 In White v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reaffirmed the validity of the settled insanity defense.354
However, the case illustrates the difficulty of obtaining a settled
insanity instruction. The defense applies only "when prolonged,
habitual, and chronic alcohol or drug abuse has created a mental
disease or defect."
355
In White, the defendant, who was charged with murder and as-
sault on a police officer, contended that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to instruct the jury on settled insanity.356 At trial, he prof-
fered evidence from a number of sources that he was hearing
voices, that he believed God and the devil were speaking with
him, that he had used cocaine "multiple times daily" for at least
three months prior to his arrest, that he had abused other drugs,
and that he had experienced psychosis at the time of the of-
fenses.3 7 The court held that the defendant's proffer failed to
support an instruction because it did not meet the threshold re-
quirement that the abuse of drugs or alcohol be "long-term,
chronic, and habitual."358
350. Id. at 260, 645 S.E.2d at 924.
351. Id. at 258-59, 645 S.E.2d at 923.
352. Id. at 255, 645 S.E.2d at 921.
353. See White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 626, 636 S.E.2d 353, 357 (2006).
354. See id.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 621, 636 S.E.2d at 354.
357. Id. at 623-25, 636 S.E.2d at 355-56.
358. Id. at 629, 636 S.E.2d at 358.
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N. Uttering
In Bennett v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged his
convictions for uttering a forged public record. 35 9 Bennett had ap-
plied for a duplicate driver's license.36 ° To do so, he had his photo-
graph taken at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and when the
digital photograph appeared on a screen, he signed a false
name.3" 1 As a result of signing his name, the computer generated
a driver's license under the false name.362 The defendant left
without the license.363 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
framed the issue as: "whether the act of signing a false name on
an electronic screen, which constitutes a forgery, is also an utter-
ing since the act of signing the screen initiates the transaction to
obtain the forged public document."364 The court noted that while
forgery and uttering are separate crimes with distinct elements,
in this instance the nature of the driver's license application
process meant that the "[ulttering was completed simultaneously
with the forgery. "365 When the defendant signed the false name
on the screen, he "asserted to the DMV agent that the false name
on the screen was good and valid, and he thereby instituted the
process that produced the fraudulent license."366
VI. WRITS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE
The published decisions in this area demonstrate the rigor of
the standard for obtaining a writ of actual innocence. In the case
of In re Carpitcher, the defendant was convicted of aggravated
sexual battery, taking indecent liberties with a minor, and object
sexual penetration.367 The convictions were based primarily on
the testimony of the victim, the daughter of Carpitcher's girl-
friend.3"' After trial, the victim recanted. 369 Relying on this recan-
359. 48 Va. App. 354, 355, 631 S.E.2d 332, 332 (Ct. App. 2006).
360. Id. at 356, 631 S.E.2d at 333.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 355-56, 631 S.E.2d at 332.
365. Id. at 357-58, 631 S.E.2d at 333-34.
366. Id. at 358, 631 S.E.2d at 334.
367. 273 Va. 335, 339, 641 S.E.2d 486, 488-89 (2007).
368. See id. at 340, 641 S.E.2d at 489.
369. Id.
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tation, Carpitcher filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence.37 °
Following a remand from the court of appeals, the circuit court
held a hearing, during which the victim said she had lied in her
prior testimony.3 71 The trial court, in answering the questions
posed by the court of appeals, concluded that while the victim had
obviously lied at some point, it was impossible to tell which ver-
sion was the correct one.372 The trial court also found that the vic-
tim was subjected to extensive and ongoing pressure from her
mother to recant. 73 The court of appeals refused to grant the writ
and Carpitcher appealed.374
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it would review legal
conclusions of the court of appeals de novo, but review its factual
findings under a deferential standard because the court of ap-
peals was exercising its original jurisdiction in adjudicating the
petition for a writ of actual innocence. 3" The critical issue for the
court was whether the recantation was "material."376 Materiality
in this context is synonymous with "true."377 Thus, to obtain a
writ of actual innocence, the petitioner must prove that the re-
cantation is true. Otherwise, every recantation, even highly sus-
pect ones, would require the court to grant the writ.378 In this in-
stance, the court of appeals did not err in concluding that
Carpitcher failed to meet his burden of proving that the victim's
recantation was true.379 While the evidence showed the victim
spoke falsely on one or more occasions, the petitioner failed to
show that the recantation was true.8 °
370. Id. at 340-41, 641 S.E.2d at 489.
371. Id. at 341, 641 S.E.2d at 489.
372. See id., 641 S.E.2d at 489-90.
373. See id., 641 S.E.2d at 490.
374. Id. at 342, 641 S.E.2d at 490.
375. Id. at 342-43, 641 S.E.2d at 490-91.
376. See id. at 344, 641 S.E.2d at 491.
377. Id. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 492.
378. Id. at 345-46, 641 S.E.2d at 492.
379. Id. at 346, 641 S.E.2d at 493.
380. See id.
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VII. LEGISLATION
A. Criminal Procedure
1. Defense Counsel-Compensation
Counsel representing indigent defendants are now permitted to
request a waiver of the low caps on fees for such representa-
tion.38' The law allows counsel to seek, in addition to the standard
capped fee, a modest supplement, ranging from $120 in general
district court to $850 for felonies if the punishment may exceed
twenty years in prison.382 Factors which guide a court in deter-
mining whether the cap should be waived include the time rea-
sonably necessary for representation, the effort expended, and the
novelty and difficulty of the issues presented.383 Additionally,
counsel can request a further waiver beyond this supplement;
however, all the fee cap waivers are subject to regulations prom-
ulgated by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.38 4 Furthermore, once the money set aside for those waivers
has been spent, no further waivers can be granted.385
2. Defense Counsel-Subpoenas
Defense attorneys can now, like prosecutors, issue summons
for witnesses in criminal cases.38 6 When a summons is issued,
counsel must file with the clerk of the court the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses for whom a subpoena has been issued.387
3. Driver's Licenses, Restricted Permits
Under existing law, a person whose license to drive has been
suspended or revoked can obtain a restricted permit for "medi-
381. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. The Executive Secretary has posted information on the subject at http://www.
courts.state.va.us/news/news/2007_0626_waivers of statutory-feecaps.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2007).
385. Id.
386. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-267 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
387. Id.
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cally necessary transportation" for an elderly parent. 38 8 The Gen-
eral Assembly expanded the scope of this provision by allowing a
court to issue a restricted license to transport "any person resid-
ing in the person's household."3 9
4. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts--Jurisdiction
Under prior law, once a juvenile was treated as an adult, the
juvenile court was forever divested of jurisdiction over the juve-
nile for subsequent cases.39 ° The General Assembly changed this
provision and juvenile court jurisdiction is now precluded only if
the juvenile was actually convicted as an adult in circuit court. 9
5. Motions to Dismiss by the Prosecution
In Roe v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that an order dismissing an indictment, without more, consti-
tuted a dismissal with prejudice. 392 Responding to this outcome,
the General Assembly provided that now, when the prosecution
obtains the dismissal of a case, a future prosecution will not be
precluded unless jeopardy had attached or the dismissal order
explicitly states that the dismissal is with prejudice.393
6. Rape Shield
The General Assembly expanded the scope of the rape shield
statute to cover prosecutions under the several statutes that
criminalize taking indecent liberties with children.394
388. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
389. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 194, 2007 Va. Acts 277 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-271.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
390. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004) (interpret-
ing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
391. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 221, 2007 Va. Acts 307 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-271 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
392. 271 Va. 453, 459, 628 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2006).
393. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 419, 2007 Va. Acts 589 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-265.6 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
394. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 890, 2007 Va. Acts 2424 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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7. Sentencing
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 sets forth the evidence a jury
may hear at the sentencing phase of a non-capital felony or a
Class 1 misdemeanor case.39 5 The sentencing phase, like the guilt
phase, is divided into three components: the prosecution's case-in-
chief, any defense evidence, and, finally, the prosecution's rebut-
tal.3 96 In Gillespie v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia construed this statute to limit the prosecution's presenta-
tion, during its case-in-chief, to evidence about the conviction
itself. 397 "[I]nformation concerning proceedings subsequent to
conviction, such as sentence, suspension, probation or other reha-
bilitative efforts" had to be redacted.398 The General Assembly
nullified this holding by permitting the prosecution to adduce,
during its case-in-chief, evidence not only of the defendant's con-
viction, but also of the punishments imposed pursuant to those
convictions.3 99 The same amendment also confirmed that the
Commonwealth can present victim impact testimony during its
case-in-chief, and is not limited to presenting such evidence dur-
ing the rebuttal portion of the sentencing hearing. 00 The legisla-
tion codified the result in Washington v. Commonwealth. °1
8. Speedy Trial
Under prior law, the speedy trial clock was tolled during the
pendency of a pre-trial appeal by the Commonwealth and this pe-
riod of tolling ended upon the issuance of the mandate by the ap-
pellate court.402 The General Assembly added sixty days of tolling
to this time.40 3 The General Assembly also clarified that the pro-
395. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
396. See id.
397. 272 Va. 753, 759, 636 S.E.2d 430, 433 (2006).
398. Id. at 760, 636 S.E.2d at 433.
399. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 478, 2007 Va. Acts 649 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
400. Id.
401. See 48 Va. App. 486, 492, 632 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2006).
402. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-409 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
403. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 414, 2007 Va. Acts 586 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-409 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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visions of the speedy trial statute apply to adults whose prelimi-
nary hearing occurs in general district court. 404
9. Venue in Child Pornography Cases
The General Assembly enacted a broad venue provision for
prosecutions charging the production of child pornography. In
such cases, venue is proper where the unlawful act occurs or
where the material is produced, reproduced, found, stored, or pos-
sessed.4 °5
B. Specific Crimes
1. Abuse and Neglect of Incapacitated Adults
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-
369, which generally punishes as a Class 5 felony the abuse or
neglect of an incapacitated adult.40 6 The amendment specifies
that where the abuse or neglect results in death, the perpetrator
is guilty of a Class 3 felony, a penalty more severe than that in-
curred for involuntary manslaughter.4 7
2. Capital Murder
The General Assembly expanded the list of predicates that
render a premeditated murderer eligible for the death penalty.
First, the murder of a judge or justice, including substitute
judges, may be charged with capital murder if the killing was "for
the purpose of interfering with [the judge or justice's] official du-
ties as a judge."408 Second, the murderer of a witness is now also
eligible for the death penalty if the murder occurs (1) in a crimi-
nal case, (2) where the witness was under subpoena, and (3) the
404. Act of Apr. 10, 2007, ch. 944, Va. Acts 2654 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
405. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
406. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 562, 2007 Va. Acts 769 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-369 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
407. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-369 (Cum. Supp. 2007). Involuntary manslaughter is a
Class 5 felony. Id. § 18.2-36 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
408. Id. § 18.2-31(14) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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killing was for the purpose of interfering with the witness's duties
in the case.4 °9
3. Driving Under the Influence
Under prior law, a person "convicted of three offenses [of DUI]
within a 10-year period shall upon conviction of the third offense
be guilty of a Class 6 felony." 410 Punishment as a Class 6 felony
thus depended on whether conviction for a first offense occurred
within ten years, rather than whether the drunk driving occurred
within ten years. The General Assembly clarified this language to
provide that any person convicted of "three violations of this sec-
tion committed within a 10-year period is guilty of a Class 6 fel-
ony."4 1
1
4. Extortion of Immigrants
In an effort to protect immigrants, the General Assembly made
it a Class 5 felony to destroy, remove, or confiscate certain docu-
ments, including passports or immigration documents, with the
intent to extort money. 412
5. Felony Obstruction of Justice
Prosecutors have been added to the list of persons protected by
the felony obstruction of justice statute.413
6. Firearms
In reaction to a tactic employed by New York City, the General
Assembly criminalized as a Class 6 felony any attempt to entice
a firearms dealer to sell a firearm to someone other than an "ac-
tual buyer."41 4 The provision does not apply to law enforcement
officers.415
409. Id. § 18.2-31(15) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
410. Id. § 18.2-270(C)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
411. Act of Mar. 12, 2007, ch. 258, 2007 Va. Acts 347 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-272(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
412. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 547, 2007 Va. Acts 747 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-59 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
413. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
414. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 509, 2007 Va. Acts 691 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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7. Protective Orders-Repeat Offenders
Violating a protective order is a Class 1 misdemeanor.416 Mind-
ful of the problems associated with recurring violations, the Gen-
eral Assembly established an enhanced punishment for second
and third offenses. An offender who violates a protective order
anew within five years of a prior conviction faces a mandatory
minimum of sixty days in jail if the violation is accompanied by
an act or threat of violence.417 A third violation within twenty
years of the first conviction is a Class 6 felony if any one of the of-
fenses is or was based on an act or a threat of violence.
41 8
8. Gang Related or Inspired Crimes
The list of predicate crimes for criminal street gangs has been
expanded to include the use or display of a firearm during the
commission of a felony.41 9
9. Sexual Crimes
Under a new provision of the code, it is now a Class 1 misde-
meanor to commit an act of "sexual abuse" against a child who is
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen.42 ° Sexual abuse is de-
fined as forcing a child to touch the defendant's, the child's, or an-
other's "intimate parts" combined with the intent to sexually mo-
lest, arouse, or gratify.
421
10. Sex Offender Registry
Those previously convicted of a "sexually violent offense" are
prohibited from entering on school or child day center property,
unless the person is voting, is enrolled at the school, or has ob-
tained a court order allowing entry on the property. 422
ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(L1) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
415. Id.
416. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. § 18.2-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
420. Id. § 18.2-67.4:2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
421. See id. § 18.2-67.10(6)(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
422. Id. § 18.2-370.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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Convicted sex offenders who are required to register with the
Virginia State Police for inclusion in the sex offender registry
must now register their e-mail address and instant messaging
screen name.423 Changes in such names must be updated with the
State Police within thirty minutes.424
In addition, following a mandatory registration with the Vir-
ginia State Police, nursing homes will receive automatic updates
of sex offenders within the same or a contiguous zip code.4 25 Nurs-
ing homes must also ascertain whether a potential patient is a
registered sex offender if the home anticipates that the patient
will stay more than three days or he does, in fact, stay more than
three days.4 26 Nursing homes are further required to inform pa-
tients about the sex offender registry and, if requested, to assist
them in obtaining information from the registry. 421
423. Id. § 9.1-903(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
424. Id. § 9.1-903(G) (Cum Supp. 2007).
425. Id. §§ 9.1-914 & 32.1-127(B)(13) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
426. Id. §§ 9.1-914 & 32.1-127(B)(14) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
427. Id. § 32.1-138(A)(16) (Cum Supp. 2007).
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